Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda and Counterterrorism by Guiora, Amos N.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 71 | Number 4
Summer 2011
Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda and
Counterterrorism
Amos N. Guiora
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Amos N. Guiora, Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda and Counterterrorism, 71 La. L. Rev. (2011)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol71/iss4/3
Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda and
Counterterrorism
Amos N. Guiora*
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's attempt to blow up Northwest
Flight 2531 and Umar Faisal Shahzad's attempt to blow up an SUV
on New York City's 42nd Street 2 led many to question whether
terrorism justifies denying Miranda protections to suspected
terrorists beyond the public safety exception. 3 As the November
Copyright 2011, by AMos N. GuIoRA.
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah.
There has been, over the years, an enormous amount of scholarly literature
addressing Miranda, its effects, costs, and benefits. In addition, there was
significant literature pre-Miranda that undoubtedly shaped the Court's thinking,
perhaps most importantly that of Chief Justice Warren. My thinking on the
Miranda issue-its historical basis, its application to terrorism, and its costs and
benefits-has been shaped by the following combination of factors: my
professional experience as prosecutor and judge in the Israel Defense Forces and
the Judge Advocate General Corps; researching (including interviews with U.S.
interrogators based in Iraq) for my book, Constitutional Limits on Coercive
Interrogation; extended conversations and exchanges with Professor Lewis Katz
(whose classroom discussions from 1984 regarding Miranda serve as the basis
for how I teach Miranda today); interaction with law enforcement officials; my
debate with my good friend and colleague Professor Paul Cassell, who has been
the most forceful advocate for denying Miranda rights to suspected terrorists;
and the extraordinarily rich and thoughtful pre- and post-Miranda scholarship
from which I enormously benefitted.
Many thanks to Meredith McNett, Information Delivery Services Librarian at
S.J. Quinney Law Library, for her invaluable assistance.
1. Richard Sisk et al., Foiled Terror Plot Aboard Northwest Flight 253 Sparks
Strict Scrutiny Rules for Air Passengers, N.Y. DAILY NEwS (Dec. 26, 2009),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/12/26/2009-12-26_foiledterror_
plotaboard northwest flight_253_sparks strictsecurity rules for_.html.
2. Al Baker & William K. Rashbaum, Police Find Car Bomb in Times
Square, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/05/02/nyregion/02timessquare.html.
3. For public commentary and debate regarding Miranda and possible
exceptions in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, see Richard M. Esenberg, You
Have the Right to Remain Silent, MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (May 12,
2010), http://law.marquette.edulfacultyblog/2010/05/12/you-have-the-right-to-
remain-silent/; Orin Kerr, Legislating Miranda Rights for Terrorism Cases?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 10, 2010, 2:56 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/05/10/
legislating-miranda-rights-for-terrorism-cases; Brian Levin, Exception to Miranda
Takes Center Stage in Times Square Plot, HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2010, 3:28
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-levin-jd/exception-to-miranda-take b
563075.html; Rick Pildes, Should Congress Codify the Public Safety Exception to
Miranda for Terrorism Cases?, BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2010), http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2010/05/should-congress-codify-public-safety.html; Michael Stem,
A Final Word on Congress and Miranda, POINT OF ORD. (May 8, 2010), http://
www.dl040331.dotsterhost.com/applications/serendipity/index.php?/archives/
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27, 2010 arrest of a naturalized U.S. citizen, Mohamed Osman
Mohamud, on suspicion of using a weapon for purposes of causing
mass destruction made clear, the list of "triggering events" is
constantly evolving.
The argument, in a nutshell, is that extending Miranda
protections to a recently arrested suspected terrorist would
significantly hamper law enforcement's ability to question the
individual, thereby endangering the public. In other words,
denying Miranda protections would both facilitate arrests of
additional suspected terrorists and prevent further acts of terrorism.
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court created the "Miranda
warning."s In New York v. Quarles,6 the Court created an
exception to Miranda according to which public safety justifies an
absence of the warning, and therefore statements given to police in
context of public safety are admissible in court.
Those advocating "Miranda denial" claim that the public safety
exception to Miranda set forth in Quarles is insufficient in the face
of terrorism. In the immediate aftermath of Shahzad's terrorist
attack, Attorney General Eric Holder inexplicably aided advocates
of this claim when he stated on ABC's "This Week":
The [Miranda] system we have in place has proven to be
effective. .. . I think we also want to look and determine
whether we have the necessary flexibility-whether we have
222-A-Final-Word-on-Congress-and-Miranda.html; Michael Stem, Congress,
Miranda, and the "Public Safety" Exception, POINT OF ORD. (May 17, 2010),
http://www.dl040331.dotsterhost.com/applications/serendipity/index.php?/archive
s/219-Congress,-Miranda-and-the-Public-Safety-Exception.html; Dan E. Stigall,
The Public Safety Exception to Miranda. A Comparative Analysis, COMP. L. BLOG
(May 7, 2010), http://comparativelawblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/public-safety-
exception-to-miranda.html.
4. Somali-American Accused of Plotting to Bomb Oregon Tree-Lighting
Event, CNN.cOM (Nov. 27, 2010, 9:27 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/
11/27/oregon.bomb.plot/index.html.
5. Miranda held that police must give criminal suspects in custody, before
they are interrogated, a warning informing them of their rights. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although this warning varies slightly by
jurisdiction, the typical warning is:
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be
used against you in a court of law. You have the right to speak to an
attorney, and to have an attorney present during any questioning. If you
cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided for you at government
expense.
The Miranda Warning, U.S. CONST. ONLINE, http://www.usconstitution.net/
miranda.html (last modified Jan. 8, 2010).
6. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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a system that deals with situations that agents now confront.
. . . We're now dealing with international terrorism.... I
think we have to give serious consideration to at least
modifying that public-safety exception [to the Miranda
protections]. And that's one of the things that I think we're
going to be reaching out to Congress, to come up with a
proposal that is both constitutional, but that is also relevant
to our times and the threats that we now face.7
Whether Attorney General Holder was merely pandering for
political purposes or was articulating a new policy is unclear.
Whichever alternative-as my colleague Professor Paul Cassell
correctly noted when we debated the subject of this Article-
Attorney General Holder provided unexpected "ammunition" to
those who believe that Miranda protections hamper effective
counterterrorism.8 Professor Cassell was spot-on in emphasizing
Attorney General Holder's extraordinary comments. Attorney
General Holder manifested a troubling combination of political
weakness and fundamental ignorance regarding Miranda and
interrogations.
Attorney General Holder's words are troubling because they
reflect an administration incapable of articulating cohesive,
consistent, and coherent homeland security and counterterrorism
policies. The examples are disturbing and numerous. They range
from the failure to close the detention center in Guantdnamo Bay;
the aggressive enforcement of an interrogation regime
fundamentally distinct from that created by the Bush
Administration;9 the stunning inability to determine the appropriate
judicial forum policy for post-9/11 detainees; and the reliance on
court-ordered habeas corpus hearings to mask the continued,
indefinite detention policy that systematically denies detainees
7. Nico Pitney, Eric Holder: Miranda Rights Should Be Modified for
Terrorism Suspects, HUFFINGTON POST (May 9, 2010, 9:28 AM), http://www.huf
fingtonpost.com/2010/05/09/eric-holder-miranda-right_n_569244.html; Charlie
Savage, Holder Backing Law to Restrict Miranda Rights, N.Y. TRIES, May 10,
2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/us/politics/
10holder.html. For a critical response to the Attorney General's comments, see
Letter from Nat'1 Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. to Attorney Gen. Eric
Holder (May 17, 2010), available at http://www.opensocietypolicycenter.org/pub/
doc_ 162/Letter/2to%20AG%2OHolder/20re%20Miranda.pdf
8. Paul Cassell, Time to Codify a Miranda Exception for Terrorists?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 21, 2010, 10:27 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/
10/21/time-to-codify-a-miranda-exception-for-terrorists/.
9. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST
(Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
11/01/AR2005110101644.html.
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their day in court. Attorney General Holder's incomprehensible
clumsiness reinforces a belief that, when push comes to shove,
protecting individual rights-even for the Obama Administration
-unfortunately takes a back seat.'0
The rapidity with which Attorney General Holder was willing
to minimize the rights of terrorists, or more accurately, of
individuals merely suspected of involvement in terrorism, is deeply
disturbing." The emphasis on "suspect" is deliberate; the
individual-whether interrogated in the immediate aftermath of
arrest or in the station house-is merely an individual suspected of
involvement in criminal activity and is deserving of protections.
The Obama Administration's apparent inability, or
unwillingness, to clearly articulate the clear and present threat
posing an incontrovertible danger to national security raises similar
concerns. Attorney General Holder's extraordinary testimony
before the House Judiciary Committee, in which he refused to
articulate that radical Islam was a motivation for Umar Faisal
Shahzad's attempt to blow up an SUV on New York City's 42nd
Street, was jaw dropping.12 It reflected either willful blindness or
disturbing ignorance, either of which is troubling.
My deep objection to denying suspected terrorists Miranda
protections is based on both of these concerns. My first concern is
the ready willingness to minimize rights for a loosely defined
10. Id.
11. The lack of media scrutiny regarding Attorney General Holder's
position is equally disturbing. It is plausible to assume that the media would
have been more vigilant if the pronouncement had been articulated by the Bush
Administration's Attorney General, whose policies were justifiably criticized for
their extraordinary violations of civil and political rights. Although outside the
purview of this Article, the harsh glare of media attention to which Bush
Administration policies were rightfully subjected has-unfortunately and
disturbingly-been moderated. Media criticism of the Obama Administration
reflects discouragement or disappointment-"the greater the expectation, the
greater the disappointment"-rather than rigorous, thoughtful analysis of
policies implemented and opportunities missed. Just as the media occasionally
asks, "Where is Obama?" I suggest that the question, "Where is the media?" is
similarly appropriate.
12. KeepAmericaSafeCom, Eric Holder Refuses to Say "Radical Islam"
Before the House Judiciary Committee, YoUTUBE (May 13, 2010), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v-HOQtmP6Pgg. Holder's testimony reflects
Administration policy with respect to defining threats and terms. Obama Bans
Terms "Islam" and "Jihad"from U.S. Security Document, HAARETZ.COM (Apr.
7, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news/obama-bans-terms-islam-and-jihad-from
-u-s-security-document-1.909. I had a similarly disjointed and jarring experience
in London when researching my book, Freedom from Religion: Rights and
National Security, where in a series of meetings with senior British Home Office
officials, I was repeatedly assured that "there is no extremism in Islam" and
there is "no terrorism in Islam."
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category of individuals, in the face of public scrutiny and criticism
in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. Second, I am
concerned by the simultaneous unwillingness to recognize and
define a threat meeting objective "clear and present" standards.
The Supreme Court has already established a public safety
exception to Miranda. Expanding the exception is fraught with
danger, particularly when the proposal is raised in the immediate
aftermath of an act of terrorism. My skepticism about such an
exception draws strength from law enforcement officials' 3 who
have neither advocated nor requested such a measure, suggesting
that the existing standard is sufficient for lawful and effective
domestic counterterrorism.14 Simply put, Quarles's public safety
exception is sufficient; expansion beyond that is both unwarranted
and dangerous.
Unfortunately, American history is replete with examples of
the high price innocent individuals have paid for executive branch
excessf5 aided by an acquiescent Congress and docile Supreme
Court. This past highlights the extraordinary dangers inherent in
an unwarranted expansion of executive power.16 The past, both
near and far alike, provides clear and direct guidance regarding the
dangers of creating exceptions in the face of a threat, whether real
or imagined. In weighing whether to expand the exception, and
thereby to argue that Quarles is insufficient, our most poignant
guide should be the timeless words of the poet and philosopher
George Santayana: "Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it."18 In Miranda, the Supreme Court penned
some of its most important words; Quarles articulates an exception
to those words.
This Article argues that expanding that exception poses
significant risks; any potential benefits do not outweigh the certain
costs. Part I details the critically important history underpinning
Miranda and the fundamental protections it enshrines for
individuals before setting forth the foundations of the public safety
exception in Quarles. Part II analyzes the application of Miranda-
13. The reference is to those actively engaged in active law enforcement.
14. See generally Fred Medick, Exporting Miranda: Protecting the Right
Against Self-Incrimination When U.S. Officers Perform Custodial Interrogations
Abroad, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173 (2009).
15. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
16. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214; Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); The Prize Cases,
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
17. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
18. George Santayana: Quotes, SANTAYANA EDrioN, http://www.iupui.
edul-santedit/gsantayanaquotes.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
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Quarles to terrorism and counterterrorism to demonstrate the
dangers of expanding any exceptions to Miranda as a response to
terrorism. Finally, Part III draws together lessons from the past
with a look to the future.
To history we turn.
I. THE WARREN COURT'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION
In a series of decisions-Brown v. Board ofEducation,' Gideon
v. Wainwright,20 Griswold v. Connecticut 21 Mapp v. Ohio,22 and
Miranda v. Arizona2 3-the Warren Court dramatically expanded
civil rights by aggressively using the power of the federal judiciary
in a criminal procedure revolution.25 Miranda, the cornerstone of the
Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution, has become the
symbol for the expansion of civil rights that was, in many ways, the
essence of the Warren Court. In keeping with this Article's narrow
focus of analyzing the relationship between Miranda and terrorism,
other significant decisions of the Warren Court's criminal procedure
revolution will not be addressed.
A. Miranda's Historical Underpinnings
Commentators have long suggested that a series of cases, in
particular the continued extraordinary and unconscionable denial
of criminal process rights for African Americans in the Deep
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court held that segregation of school children
solely on the basis of race denies African American children equal protection of
the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
20. 372 U.S. 335 (1961). The Court held that under the Sixth Amendment
an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to the right to counsel in a state
criminal trial.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court held that a constitutional right to
privacy exists in marital affairs.
22. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court held that evidence obtained by search
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible and vitiates
conviction.
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. The "Warren Court" refers to the Supreme Court (1953-1969) when
Earl Warren served as Chief Justice. See The Law: The Legacy of the Warren
Court, TIME, July 4, 1969, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,840195,00.html.
25. See Mark Tushnet, Observations on the New Revolution in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1627 (2006), and George C.
Thomas III, Through a Glass Darkly: Seeing the Real Warren Court Criminal
Justice Legacy, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 1 (2005), for thoughtful discussion
regarding the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution-which goes
beyond the purview of this Article.
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South, set the stage for the Court's holding in Miranda.26 As
Professor Thomas points out: "[F]rom 1957 to 1963, the Supreme
Court reviewed ten state court cases that had upheld convictions
based on voluntary confessions. The Court reversed eight of the
ten cases, indicating that it was not satisfied with the way the states
were applying the voluntariness test."27
In an effort to provide guidance to state courts, the Court in
Culombe v. Connecticut articulated a voluntariness standard based
on "philosophy, psychology and law."28
Accordingly, the Court's decision in Miranda was not out of
the blue; after all, police misconduct in interrogations had been
alleged in the U.S. for decades and has been a persistent reality for
hundreds of years worldwide. 2 9 Nevertheless, it was not until the
late 1800s that the Supreme Court issued its initial ruling regarding
the inadmissibility of coerced interrogations. In Bran v. United
States, the Court held:
A confession can never be received in evidence where the
prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise; for
the law cannot measure the force of the influence used, or
decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and
therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of
influence has been exerted.30
Thirty years after Bram, the Wickersham Commission
unflinchigly exposed the institutionalized practice of police
brutality. President Hoover appointed the Commission primarily
26. See George C. Thomas III, Miranda: The Crime, the Man, and the Law
of Confessions, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 7, 16
(Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE MIRANDA
DEBATE] (citing Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us,
57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 238, 240 (1966)). Packer stated,
"What we have seen in the South is the perversion of the criminal process into
an instrument of official oppression. . . . Powers of arrest and prosecution have
been repeatedly and flagrantly abused in the interest of maintaining an illegal,
not to say unconstitutional, social system." Packer, supra, at 240.
27. Thomas, supra note 26, at 17.
28. 367 U.S. 568, 603-04 (1961); see also Thomas, supra note 26, at 18.
29. The so-called "rack and screw" methods and other methods of torture
have been used (misused and abused) throughout history. Due to the narrow
constraints of this Article, the torture-based regime implemented by the Bush
Administration in the aftermath of 9/11 will not be addressed.
30. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897) (quoting 3 WM.
OLDNALL RUSSELL ET AL., A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478
(6th ed. 1896)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See generally UNITED STATES WICKERSHAM COMMISSION RECORDS,
1928-1931: FINDING AID (2003), available at http://www.comparativelaw.
org/Wickersham.pdf.
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for two reasons: the public's increasing worries regarding crime, in
particular the Chica2go gang wars, and efforts to resolve the debate
over Prohibition.3 Commission members were shocked to
discover the degree to which suspects questioned in the police
station were sub ected to an interrogation method known as the
"third degree,"3 which the Commission defined as "the use of
physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary
confessions or admissions. 3 4
The Commission members' discovery that police interrogations
violated standards of decency and humanity is of particular
importance to this Article. Simply put, state agents consistently
violated the rights of those who most deserved protection-the
truly vulnerable members of society. This was particularly true
with respect to African Americans in the Deep South. Although
analogy can create uncertainty, this dark era in American history
offers powerful and relevant lessons in discussions regarding
exceptions to the rights of vulnerable individuals. The Wickersham
Commission directly suggests the extraordinary harm that can
result from interrogations devoid of control.
Forty years after Bram, and in the aftermath of the Wickersham
Commission, the Supreme Court revisited the brutal reality of
interrogations conducted by law enforcement primarily, but not
exclusively, in the Deep South.3 5
Because history provides important lessons for the present, a
brief review of four critical pre-Miranda cases illustrates the
dangers posed by unregulated excess. Although the Court was
criticized for belatedly entering the fray, the reality of these
holdings was unmistakable: the Court directly sought to protect the
interrogatee by holding that confessions resulting from police
brutality were inadmissible.
The cases below are undeniably horrific; their consistent
reoccurrence was significantly influenced by state courts. Those
who advocate expanding Quarles suggest that the existing public
32. See UNiV. PUBL'NS OF AM., RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION
ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PART I (1997), available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa~cis/1965_WickershamCom
mPtl.pdf.
33. See Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused: A Remedy for
the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1930), reprinted in 73 MICH. L. REV.
39 (1974), for an important discussion of the Wickersham Commission and the
"third degree."
34. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCES & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931).
35. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316
U.S. 547 (1942); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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safety exception does not satisfactorily respond to the
contemporary threat terrorism poses.36 They question whether
Quarles provides law enforcement with sufficient flexibility in
interrogating a suspected terrorist. 37 We shall turn our attention to
that very question in due time, but to truly understand the
significance of creating and implementing additional exceptions,
context and history are critical even though the comparison is not
prima facie clear.
In Brown v. Mississippi, the police arrested an African
American man for allegedly murdering a white planter. A mob
repeatedly whipped the suspect under the watchful gaze of local
law enforcement and the local sheriff until the suspect's confession
was in accordance with the specific language the sheriff desired.
In excluding the confession because of the brutality used, the
Supreme Court applied a "totality of circumstances" test: "There
was thus enough before the court when these confessions were first
offered to make known to the court that the were not, beyond all
reasonable doubt, free and voluntary ... . 3'
In White v. Texas, the defendant, an illiterate African American
man, was convicted of rape and sentenced to death based on a
written confession produced after a series of brutal beatings
administered by local law enforcement.40 The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that "due process of law,
preserved for all by our Constitution, commands that no such
practice as that disclosed by this record shall send any accused to
his death."4 1
In Ward v. Texas, the defendant confessed after three days of
cumulative mistreatment during which he was driven from county
to county, placed in a jail 100 miles from his home, beaten
whipped, and burned by the officer to whom he finally confessed. 4
In overturning the confession, the Court held:
36. Miranda & Terror Suspects-Podcast, FEDERALIST SOC'Y (Feb. 4,
2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubid.2089/pubdetail.asp.
37. Id.
38. Brown, 297 U.S. at 280-82.
39. Id. at 283; see also Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The
Changing Nature ofPolice Interrogation in America, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE,
supra note 26, at 65, 71. According to Leo, "Brown set in motion a revolution in
the constitutional jurisprudence of criminal procedure that culminated in the
Miranda decision thirty years later. Although Miranda is the most famous
confession case, it was Brown that exercised the greatest influence on coercive
interrogation practices." Leo, supra, at 71.
40. White, 310 U.S. at 532-33 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241
(1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940)).
41. Id. at 553.
42. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 549-52 (1942).
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The effect of moving an ignorant negro by night and day to
strange towns, telling him of threats of mob violence, and
questioning him continuously is evident from petitioner's
statement to County Attorney Rolston that he would be
glad to make any statement that Rolston desired.
Disregarding petitioner's claims that he was whipped and
burned, we must conclude that his confession was not free
and voluntary but was the product of coercion and duress,
that petitioner was no longer able freely to admit or to deny
or to refuse to answer, and that he was willing to make any
statement that the officers wanted him to make.43
Finally, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction in
Ashcraft v. Tennessee because Ashcraft had been held in one room
for approximately 36 consecutive hours, effectively cumulative
mistreatment rather than physical mistreatment.4 In light of the
Ashcraft dissent's important questions about whether the majority
opinion can be construed to suggest that any lengthy interrogation
is inherently coercive, it is essential to focus on the actual
coerciveness of the specific interrogation in determining whether a
confession should be admissible.
Of the four cases discussed here, Brown is the most significant.
It was the Court's initial, and clearest, articulation of the principle
that confession evidence obtained through coercive physical
interrogation violates federal constitutional due process and is
therefore to be excluded in all state cases. In other words,
confessions stemming from the unconscionable interrogation
methods and explicit coercions imposed by states-particularly
with respect to African Americans in the Deep South-would be
excluded.
These four cases are included for a specific reason: to directly
warn of the danger of state excess, legitimized by courts and
legislatures alike. Protections are essential; minimizing them is
fraught with danger particularly if not carefully delineated. From a
historical analysis, however, arriving at Miranda was not a given.
The Court traveled a certain distance before it clearly articulated
rights to be extended to a detained suspect.
In creating the criminal procedure revolution, the Warren Court
had both to reflect on the Brown, Ashcraft, White, and Ward
precedents and to clearly state what rights to protect and how to
protect them. Without clearly articulating rights, history would
43. Id. at 555.
44. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). See Yale Kamisar, Fred E.
Inbau: "The Importance of Being Guilty," 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182
(1977), for an important discussion regarding Ashcraft.
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continue to serve as a powerful reminder of the consequences of
unconscionable wiggle room.
B. The Lead-Up to Miranda
The extraordinary wrongs to which African Americans were
subjected to with mind-numbing consistency and routine is a deep
stain forever seared into American history. Precisely because of the
deep shame associated with the interrogation measures carefully-
and painfully-described by the Court in Brown, White, Ward, and
Ashcraft, Chief Justice Warren's words in Miranda carry not only
judicial weight but also reflect extraordinary sensitivity and
recognition of history.
The Warren Court has been criticized for writing a code for
police departments, rather than deciding a constitutional question,
particularly when only five justices comprised the Miranda
majority. However, Chief Justice Warren articulated, history
clearly shed light on the Court's rationale: "In a series of cases
decided by this Court long after these studies, the police resorted to
physical brutality-beatings, hanging, whipping-and to sustained
and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort
confessions.'A5
Precisely because the interaction between law enforcement and
the detained suspect is enormously complex, the way in which
protections are articulated and implemented is essential to
establishing a rights-based paradigm. In Escobedo v. Illinois,46 the
case that preceded Miranda, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached pre-indictment, thus
extending Gideon,47 which held that the right attached after
indictment.
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult
with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the
45. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446 n.5 (1966). The Court noted, "It
is significant that instances of third-degree treatment of prisoners almost
invariably took place during the period between arrest and preliminary
investigation." Id. n.6.
46. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
47. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1961).
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accused has been denied "The Assistance of Counsel" in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as
"made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment," and that no statement elicited by the police
during the interrogation may be used against him at a
criminal trial.48
According to Professor Thomas, a narrow reading of Escobedo
suggests that a suspect has the right to consult with counsel when
the following conditions are met:
(1) the investigation has begun to focus on a particular
defendant . . . ; (2) the suspect is in police custody; (3)
interrogation . . . is aimed at eliciting incriminating
statements; (4) the suspect has requested and been denied
an opportunity to secure advice from counsel; and (5) the
police fail to warn the suspect effectively of his
constitutional rights to remain silent.4 9
Therefore, the right to counsel created in Escobedo would only
attach when the questioning was directed toward a specific suspect
rather than a general questioning of a witness. Justice Goldberg
thus left open the question of when the right to counsel attaches if
the individual questioned is not a specific suspect. The distinction
between specific suspect and general questioning is critical
because the categories are fundamentally distinct. Miranda stepped
into that breach by applying the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination in a context extending beyond the specific
suspect paradigm articulated by the Court in Escobedo, building on
its holding in Malloy v. Hogan5 0 that the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination was applicable, through incorporation, in
both state and federal courts.
Needless to say, expanding the right to counsel from specific
suspect to general questioning and framing it in a Fifth
Amendment rather than Sixth Amendment context is central to the
intellectual, legal, and concrete underpinning of Miranda. In the
words of Chief Justice Warren, writing for a five-to-four majority:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the
pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
48. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91 (citation omitted).
49. Thomas, supra note 26, at 19.
50. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity
to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking[,] there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police
may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with
an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.5 1
C. Quarles and the Public Safety Exception
Eighteen years after Miranda, the Supreme Court articulated an
exception to the fundamental rights enshrined in Miranda by
setting forth the public safety exception in Quarles.52 Because the
facts of Quarles are essential to understanding the essence and
limits of the public safety exception, they are presented in full
here.
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Officer
Frank Kraft and Officer Sal Scarring were on road patrol in
Queens, New York when a young woman approached their car.
She told them that she had just been raped by an African American
male, approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a black jacket
51. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (footnote omitted).
Justices White, Harlan, and Stewart dissented, and Justice Clark dissented in
part. Id. at 499 (Clark, J., dissenting in part); id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting).
52. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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with the name "Big Ben" printed in yellow letters on the back. She
told the officers that the man had entered an A&P supermarket
located nearby and that the man was carrying a gun.
The officers drove the woman to the supermarket, and Officer
Kraft entered the store while Officer Scarring radioed for
assistance. Officer Kraft quickly spotted Quarles, who matched the
description given by the woman, approaching a checkout counter.
Apparently upon seeing the officer, Quarles turned and ran toward
the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft pursued him with a drawn
gun. When Quarles turned the corner at the end of an aisle, Officer
Kraft lost sight of him for several seconds, and upon regaining
sight of Quarles, Officer Kraft ordered him to stop and put his
hands over his head.
Although more than three other officers had arrived on the
scene by that time, Officer Kraft was the first to reach Quarles.
Officer Kraft frisked Quarles and discovered that he was wearing
an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing Quarles, Officer
Kraft asked him where the gun was. Quarles nodded in the
direction of some empty cartons and responded, "the gun is over
there." Officer Kraft thereafter retrieved a loaded .38-caliber
revolver from one of the cartons, formally placed Quarles under
arrest, and read him his Miranda rights from a printed card.
Quarles indicated that he would be willing to answer questions
without an attorney present. Officer Kraft then asked Quarles if he
owned the gun and, if so, where he had purchased it. Quarles
answered that he did own it and that he had purchased it in
Miami. 3
Based on these facts, then-Justice Rehnquist, on behalf of a six-
to-three majority, held that there is a public safety exception to
Miranda, "that the need for answers to questions in a situation
posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination."5 Recognizing that the concealed gun
posed a danger to public safety, a danger beyond concerns of
constitutionally impermissible interrogation, the Court set forth the
reasons for and parameters of the exception:
In such a situation, if the police are required to recite the
familiar Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts
of the gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be
deterred from responding. Procedural safeguards which
53. Id. at 651-52.
54. Id. at 657. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens dissented. Id. at 674
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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deter a suspect from responding were deemed acceptable in
Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege;
when the primary social cost of those added protections is
the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority
was willing to bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings
deterred Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft's
question about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would
have been something more than merely the failure to obtain
evidence useful in convicting Quarles. Officer Kraft needed
an answer to his question not simply to make his case
against Quarles but to insure that further danger to the
public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a
public area.
We decline to place officers such as Officer Kraft in the
untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter
of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask
the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and
render whatever probative evidence they uncover
inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to
preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover
but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that
evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting
them.
In recognizing a narrow exception to the Miranda rule in
this case, we acknowledge that to some degree we lessen
the desirable clarity of that rule.
The exception which we recognize today, far from
complicating the thought processes and the on-the-scene
judgments of police officers, will simply free them to
follow their legitimate instincts when confronting situations
presenting a danger to the public safety.5 5
The importance of Quarles is the creation of a public safety
exception to Miranda. The question going forward is whether the
Quarles exception is sufficient to address the unique problems
posed by counterterrorism operations.
II. MIRANDA AND COUNTERTERRORISM
In expanding Escobedo and providing greater protections to
individuals subject to police interrogation-even those not deemed
55. Id. at 657-59 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted).
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specific suspects-Chief Justice Warren clearly looked back into
the dark pages of interrogations in the U.S. The history that guided
Chief Justice Warren must serve as an important reminder with
respect to denying suspected terrorists Miranda protections.
Terrorism poses extraordinary dangers; of that, there is little
doubt. The last four decades56 have been marked by attack after
attack against innocent people worldwide defined as "legitimate
targets" by terrorists. Different nations have developed various
counterterrorism strategies, ranging from agressive measures,57 to
soft responses,5 8 to largely a non-response, to pay-off deals with
terrorists. 0 The litany of attackS61 is a telling demonstration of the
never-ending scourge of terrorism. This Article defines "terrorism"
as an attack by a group or individual in an effort to advance a
cause-religious, 6 2 social, economic, or political-by killing,
56. Although scholars debate which constitutes the initial terrorist attack of
the contemporary age, the plane hijackings of the 1960s and, in particular, the
P.L.O. attack in the Munich Olympic Games resulting in the deaths of 11 Israeli
athletes are generally understood to be the initial acts of contemporary terrorism.
See, in particular, the writings of Bruce Hoffman and Walter Laqueur.
57. See Allen Dershowitz, Targeted Killing Is Working, so Why Is the Press
Not Reporting It?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 2008, 5:25 PM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/alan-dershowitz/targeted-killing-is-worki_b79616.html; see also
Russia Ends Operations in Chechnya, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at A6, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/europe/17chechnya.html.
58. See Operation Enduring Freedom: One Year of Accomplishments,
NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/defense/
enduringfreedom.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
59. See Scores Die in Madrid Bomb Carnage, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2004,
13:46 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3500452.stm (Spain's non-response in
the aftermath of the March 2004 Madrid train bombing).
60. See Paul L. Montgomery, European Community Gives Limited Support
to Steps by the P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1988, at A6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/22/world/european-community-gives-limited-
support-to-steps-by-the-plo.html (Greece's "arrangement" with terrorist
organizations, in particular-but not exclusively-with the P.L.O.).
61. See Death by Terror, GOOD.Is, http://awesome.good.is/transparency/
web/l 005/terror-in-americalflat.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2011); see also Search
Results, GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, http://www.start.umd.edulgtd/search/
Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualtiestype=f&casualtiesmax-101&start yearo
nly-1970&endyearonly-2008&dtp2=all&success=yes&ob-GTDID&od=desc&
page=1&count-100#results-table (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). For an explanation
of the Global Terrorism Database, see GARY LAFREE & LAURA DUGAN,
INTRODUCING THE GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE (2007), available at http://
www.ccjs.umd.edulfaculty/userfiles/23/FTPV A_224594.pdf
62. Elsewhere I argue that religious extremism is the single most important
and powerful motivator for contemporary terrorism, much as secular terrorism
was in the 1970s. See AMos N. GUIORA, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION: RIGHTS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY (2009). Examples include the Red Brigade in Italy,
Baader-Mainhoff in Germany, and the Weathermen in the U.S. Id.
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harming, or intending to injure innocent civilians, or by
intimidating the civilian population from conducting its daily life.
In that regard, terrorist organizations are not bound by any sense of
morality, they are not subject to legal obligations or restrictions,
and they operate beyond any sense of restraint with two
exceptions: tactical considerations as to when is the most effective
time to attack and the nation-state's counterterrorism effectiveness.
Conversely, the nation-state is subject to legal and moral
restrictions with the understanding that limits on state power are
the essence of the rule of law.6 3
Although the polity's natural response to a terrorist attack is to
demand action by the nation-state, the essence of lawful
operational counterterrorism is that the state, to quote the
vernacular, "can't kill 'em all." Not even close; the opposite
perhaps is the true reality of counterterrorism. Although this reality
of operational counterterrorism that goes beyond criminal is
frustrating for many, constitutional and international law raise
legitimate questions regarding both its legitimacy and
effectiveness.
In applying the Miranda-Quarles framework to terrorists, the
question is what the Supreme Court intended in both cases; that is,
what are the cases' respective core principles with respect to
terrorism. Chief Justice Warren's words are extraordinarily clear
and powerful. They reflect both his deep understanding of the
American interrogation reality and the extraordinary-and
unforgiveable-price paid by untold numbers of people subjected
to methods ranging from the third degree to the unconscionable.
Chief Justice Warren's reference to Brown, White, Wade, and
Ashcraft is not just judicial craftsmanship; it is also a clarion call to
state agents that the rule of law demands protection for suspects.
The criminal procedure revolution does not limit law
enforcement's ability to detain for either interrogation or "on the
scene" crime prevention. The criminal procedure revolution does
impose on law enforcement the obligation to inform the suspect of
the right to representation by counsel during interrogation and the
right to remain silent.
As Miranda's language makes abundantly clear, creating-and
protecting-both rights is essential. In Chief Justice Warren's
words:
63. For a fuller explication of the theory of self-imposed restraints, see
Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16 (2002).
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The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is
the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant
questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. . . . In none of
these cases was the defendant given a full and effective
warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation ....
[The defendants] share salient features-incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements
without full warning of constitutional rights.6
A. Problems ofDefinition
Written in 1966 regarding suspected criminals subject to the
commonly understood criminal law paradigm, Miranda's words
hold particular weight-subject to Quarles-with respect to
suspected terrorists particularly because the terrorist paradigm has
not been defined. Nine years after 9/11, the American judiciary,
two Presidents, and four Congresses have failed to consistently and
coherently define the paradigm. Scholars and decisionmakers
debate how to categorize terrorists:65 as criminals in accordance
with the criminal law paradigm, as soldiers as defined by the
Geneva Conventions,66 or as something else reflecting a hybrid of
the criminal and prisoner-of-war paradigms. The discussion has
included numerous terms including "enemy combatant," "enemy
belligerent," "illegal belligerent," "unlawful combatant," and "non-
state actor." The failure to uniformly and consistently categorize
terrorists reflects policy, legal, and geo-political realities and
considerations. For this precise reason, expanding the Quarles
exception is to tread into dangerous waters that simply become
murkier the deeper one wades. Although the definitional
discussion is of the utmost importance, its state of fluidity must not
justify creating exceptions that unnecessarily violate the rights of
individuals merely suspected of involvement in terrorism, however
defined.
If different agencies within the U.S. executive branch defined
terrorism uniformly, those advocating for an expansion of Quarles
might have a better argument, but such uniformity is sorely
64. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
65. See JONATHAN WHITE, TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN
INTRODUCTION (5th ed. 2006); see also BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM
(rev. ed. 2006); WALTER LAQUEUR, A HISTORY OF TERRORISM (2001).
66. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, INT'L
COMMITTEE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-
law/geneva-conventions (last updated Feb. 15, 2011).
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lacking. For example, the key U.S. agencies employ the following
definitions of terrorism:
FBI
Department
of Defense
Department
of State
Domestic terrorism refers to activities that involve
acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any
state; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce
a civilian population; to influence the policy of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and occur primarily within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 67
The calculated use, or threatened use, of force or
violence against individuals or property to coerce or
intimidate governments or societies, often to
achieve political, religious, or ideological
obiectives.
I- '
The term "terrorism" means premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against
non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience. The term "international terrorist" means
terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more
than one country. The term "terrorist group" means
any group practicing, or that has significant
subgroups that practice, international terrorism. 69
In the face of such definitional uncertainty, the essential
question is: To whom are Quarles expansion advocates referring?
While some proposals70 recommend adopting the U.S. Code
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2006); see also Terrorism 2000/2001, FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www2.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2000_
2001.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
68. What Is Terrorism?, TERRORISM RES., http://www.terrorism-research.
com (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
69. The State Department definition is based on 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d).
70. Professor Cassell, who argued before the Supreme Court in Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), in which the Court held that Miranda was
constitutionally based and that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was unconstitutional, has been
at the forefront of legal scholars who have raised significant concerns regarding
Miranda. See Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of
Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S.
Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990's: An Empirical Study of the Effects
of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996). For responses to Professor
Schulhofer's criticism of Professor Cassell's argument regarding the social costs
of Miranda, see Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Re-
Assessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387 (1996), and Paul G. Cassell & Richard
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definition of terrorism, 7 1 Attorney General Holder's use of the term
was at best a catchall, without clear or careful delineation of the
specific category to which he was referring. After all, Attorney
General Holder's comments show that it is remarkably unclear
how the Attorney General defines terrorism, much less a terrorist.
The federal government's continued inability to uniformly define
the term and the multiplicity of terms bandied about since 9/11
highlight the extraordinary danger of Attorney General Holder's
recommendation. This is a marked and dramatic distinction from
the clear, direct, and unequivocal language of Chief Justice
Warren.
The fundamental danger is that this lack of definitional rigor
and exactness means that any expansion of Miranda-Quarles
would apply to an extraordinarily broad and vague group of
"terrorists." Indeed, even if Congress, for example, were to
legislate an exception to Quarles, the current reality of terrorism
and counterterrorism in the U.S. is that there is no clarity regarding
whether a just-detained individual is a terrorist to whom the new,
expanded exception applies, or a criminal to whom it would not.
Exceptions are inherently problematic, and broad exceptions
are particularly troubling. In this way, the suggested proposals
profoundly fail the constitutional standard of "void for
vagueness"72 and are overbroad." Denying Miranda protections to
an individual arrested on suspicion of involvement in terrorism
without carefully and narrowly articulating a clear standard for
whether the just-detained individual is, indeed, a suspected
terrorist 7 4 leaves a gaping hole.
Attempts to determine whether the exception applies to a
specific individual would be through a criteria-less paradigm.
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty Year Perspective on Miranda's
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998). For
responses to Professor Cassell, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical
Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 500 (1996), and John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police
Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1998). For a recent debate between
myself and Professor Cassell regarding Miranda rights for terror suspects, see
Miranda & Terror Suspects-Podcast, supra note 36.
71. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (FBI definition, based on the
U.S. Code).
72. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1143-
51 (5th ed. 2005).
73. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 87-88 (3d ed. 2002).
74. Professor Cassell's proposal is noteworthy in addressing this significant
gap. See supra note 70.
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Classifying an arrested suspect as a criminal suspect (entitled to
Miranda protections subject to the public safety exception) or a
terrorism suspect (subject to the proposed exception to the already
created exception) is enormously difficult in real time.
The possibility of applying the exception-in the absence of
criteria and definitions-poses irreversible danger to the very
rights Miranda intended to protect. In this vein, it is important to
recall, as Professor Thomas writes:
The basic dream [of the Warren Court] was, I believe, a
world in which state police, prosecutors, and judges treat
suspects and defendants fairly. . . . Equality requires that
suspects and defendants have the ability to make informed
decisions and to act on those decisions. . . . Of second
greatest importance [for the Warren Court], probably, was
the requirement in Miranda v. Arizona that suspects be
warned of the consequences of answering police questions,
be informed of their right not to answer the questions, and
be offered a lawyer to assist them in deciding whether to
answer.75
To extend beyond the carefully crafted and deliberately narrow
exception articulated by then-Justice Rehnquist, particularly when
the outer limits of an additional exception are vague and
amorphous, represents a dramatic break both with Miranda and
Quarles. Not only does this break with Miranda-Quarles go far
beyond what the Court cautiously articulated in Quarles, but it is
essential to repeat that "boots on the ground" law enforcement has
consistently not requested an additional exception in the face of
complex terrorist threats.
B. Exceptions: Justifications and Dangers
Furthermore, Attorney General Holder failed to explain why
the Quarles exception is insufficient to effectively protect America
from terrorists, however defined. After all, as the Court held, the
just-discarded pistol was admissible evidence even though Quarles
had not been read his Miranda rights. This is the essence of the
Quarles exception: "[T]he need for answers to questions in a
situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for
the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege
75. George C. Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due
Process and the Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 174
(2005).
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against self-incrimination." 76 Quite simply, I am unable to discern
why the exception is insufficient for "boots on the ground"
counterterrorism. What does Quarles not provide that is, according
to Attorney General Holder, so essential to effective homeland
security? Effective articulation of contemporary threats to the
American public would greatly help in answering this question.
Balancing legitimate national security considerations and
equally legitimate personal rights is essential to conducting lawful
operational counterterrorism. Creating exceptions in response to a
particular threat is tempting; however, it is complicated, fraught
with danger, and must be subject to extraordinarily strict scrutiny.
That does not suggest that exceptions are not legitimate; under
certain circumstances, subject to oversight and review, exceptions
are justified, if not essential. However, creating an exception
paradigm requires determinations of need, alternatives, and costs.
I come to this issue-and deep concerns regarding exception
models-based on my proposal that advocates the establishment of
a national security court. My proposal, an alternative to Article
76. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984).
77. See Improving Detainee Policy: Handling Terrorism Detainees Within the
American Justice System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 8-10 (2008) [hereinafter Improving Detainee Policy], available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735
dal3bc6al (testimony of Professor Amos Guiora); BENJAMIN WTrfEs, LAW AND
THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008); Robert
Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008); Amos N. Guiora,
Creating a Domestic Terror Court, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 617 (2009); Amos N.
Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts After Guantanamo,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 199 (2008); Amos N. Guiora, Where Are
Terrorists to Be Tried: A Comparative Analysis of Rights Granted to Suspected
Terrorists, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 805 (2007); Amos N. Guiora & John T. Parry,
Debate: Light at the End of the Pipeline? Choosing a Forum for Suspected
Terrorists, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNuMBRA 356 (2008); Harvey Rishikof, Is It
Time for a Federal Terrorist Court? Terrorists and Prosecutions: Problems,
Paradigms, and Paradoxes, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 1 (2003);
Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Legal Landscape After Hamdan: The Creation of
Homeland Security Courts, 13 NEW ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 1 (2006); Jack
L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007,
at 19; Charles D. Stimson, Holding Terrorists Accountable: A Lawful
Detainment Framework for the Long War, LEGAL MEMORANDUM (Heritage
Found., Wash., D.C.), Jan. 23, 2009, available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf
media/2009/pdf1lm35.pdf; Matthew Waxman, The Smart Way to Shut Gitmo
Down, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at B4; Jack Goldsmith, Long-Term Terrorist
Detention and Our National Security Court (Series on Counterterrorism & Am.
Statutory Law, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/
media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0209_detentiongoldsmith/0209 detentiongoldsmith.pdf,
Andrew C. McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, Outsourcing American Law: We Need a
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III courts, intends to facilitate adjudication of individual
responsibility for suspected terrorists. The proposal seeks to
resolve a constitutional and moral conundrum arising from the
continued indefinite detention of thousands of post-9/11 detainees
held in Guantdnamo, Abu Ghraib, and Bagram.
Although detainees ideally would be brought before Article III
courts, the need to protect classified intelligence information
justifies minimizing the defendant's right to confront his accuser in
those cases where criminal evidence is insufficient to proceed with
prosecution. In a nutshell, intelligence information would be used
to bolster the criminal evidence but would not be the sole basis for
conviction. Although admittedly problematic, the proposal seeks to
facilitate resolution of the indefinite detention paradigm.
However, for the reasons discussed below, expansion of the
public safety exception articulated in Quarles" is both
unwarranted and dangerous. To that end, I draw a sharp distinction
between advocating an exception to existing Article III courts and
opposing an expanded exception to Miranda protections. I am
acutely aware of the deep-and largely justified-concem 79 with
ad hoc solutions in response to a particular threat, whether direct or
indirect.8 0
Legal architecture, necessity, utilitarianism, the existence of
alternatives, and morality form the standard for measuring ad hoc
exceptions. In that vein, the indefinite detention paradigm8'
imposed by successive American administrations on thousands of
post-9/1 1 detainees manifests an acute wrong, largely resolvable
only by creating an alternative judicial regime subject to the
criteria above.
In large part, an additional exception to Miranda is
unwarranted largely because a compelling argument has not been
made that counterterrorism is facilitated by such a measure. Thus,
National Security Court (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 156, 2009),
available at http://www.aei.org/paper/100038.
78. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649.
79. For criticism of proposed alternatives to Article III courts, see JAMES J.
BENJAMIN, JR. & RICHARD B. ZABEL, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-
USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf, and Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case Against National
Security Courts, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 505 (2008).
80. For an analysis of threats, see Amos N. Guiora, Accountability and
Effectiveness in Homeland Security 5-8 (Univ. of Utah, Legal Studies Paper No.
08-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=1090328.
81. For a discussion regarding indefinite detention, see Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008), and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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the proposed exception fails on necessity and utilitarianism
grounds in addition to legal principles and morality.
Those who advocate denying Miranda protections by
expanding Quarles argue that Miranda protections (as established
by the Warren Court) are relevant only when an individual is
prosecuted. In essence, they argue that if an individual is detained
(whether lawfully or not) and subsequently interrogated (without
having been "Mirandized") but not prosecuted, then the confession
would not be subject to admissibility standards and judicial
scrutiny. Its exclusive usage with respect to the detainee, rather,
would be outside the walls of the courthouse.
The notion, therefore, is that Miranda protections, even subject
to Quarles's public safety exception, would be irrelevant in this
specific and narrow context because the information from the
interrogation or confession would be used only for intelligence
gathering and subsequent operational measures, rather than
prosecution of the individual. That is, the harm emanating from an
interrogation in which the suspect did not receive Miranda
protections is limited to a specific class of individuals; for those
not indicted, the fact they were not extended Miranda rights has no
direct impact on their status, rights, or privileges because they were
not brought before a court of law.
The argument, while arguably compelling and almost
convincing, is predicated on a particularly narrow reading of
Miranda and is devoid of sensitivity to and cognizance of
operational realities. The overarching question must be principled,
not practical: Is the public safety exception to Miranda established
in Quarles sufficient with respect to terrorism? In other words, is
there a need to create an additional exception with respect to
terrorism and individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism? It
is in addressing this question that the proposal fails on necessity
and utilitarianism grounds.
Attraction notwithstanding, the argument posed above falls
short because when the individual is initially interrogated, whether
at the scene or at the station house, future prosecutorial intention
is, at best, purely speculative. Therefore, expanding the public
safety exception based on possible acts committed by the
individual-and on the theory that he will not be prosecuted-
poses an unwarranted danger in the context of rights protection.
After all, it is unclear whether detention and interrogation are
intended to gather information about others or to prevent a future
terrorist attack-suggesting the information serves a direct
operational purpose-rather than facilitate prosecution of the
detainee. That very uncertainty demands that Miranda protections
not be eviscerated. Although perhaps tempting from the
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perspective of short-term political considerations, the likely impact
on individual rights is too significant to minimize. This impact is
particularly acute when relevant prosecutorial decisionmaking is
more uncertain than certain at the very moment Miranda rights
must be extended, albeit subject to the public safety exception
previously established by the Supreme Court.
III. LOOKING BACK-LOOKING FORWARD
The terrorism paradigm is, as I have previously suggested,
distinct from both the traditional criminal law and war paradigms.
Nonetheless, extraordinary care must be taken when
recommending an exception to existing case law and legislation.
The care and caution must take into consideration the practical and
philosophical consequences and whether sufficient protections and
safeguards are institutionalized when creating a rights-minimizing
regime. This is particularly problematic when basic issues
regarding terrorism have not been satisfactorily resolved and
therefore the contours of the exception are dangerously vague. To
expand upon Quarles is, in essence, to create a rights-minimization
paradigm devoid of standards, criteria, and careful limits. This is
fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court's philosophical and
jurisprudential goals for limits on state power (Miranda).
While the unconscionable treatment of African Americans in
the jailhouses of the Deep South is a never ending stain on
America, of equal shame is the acquiescence of the legal
community to the horrors inflicted by law enforcement. It is
important to recall: not only were African Americans subjected to
horrific beatings and unrelenting brutality, either directly or
indirectly, by the local constable, but state court after state court
turned a willful blind eye on what was a constant reality. In other
words, the latter constantly and consistently acquiesced regarding
actions of the former. That same pattern-harsh state action
followed by judicial acquiescence-largely typifies the American
paradigm in the past decade. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush
Administration created a torture-based interrogation regime82 for
individuals detained in Iraq and Afghanistan and interrogated in
Guantinamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and other detention
centers. 83 In clear violation of the United Nations Convention
82. See John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at
26, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2004/05/23/the-roots-of-torture.html.
83. In addition, some detainees were "turned over" to intelligence services
of other nations with the tacit understanding that those detainees would be
subject to interrogation measures not applied by the U.S. This process, known as
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Against Torture, 84 the Geneva Conventions, 8 and the U.S.
Constitution,8 6 detainees were tortured by methods ranging from
waterboarding;87 to excessive physical beatings;8 8 to the much-
documented actions of Lynndie England, Charles Graner, and
others at Abu Ghraib.89 The Supreme Court-when presented the
opportunity-fell far short of upholding the moral standards, not to
mention legal limits, that are the essence of the Warren Court's
criminal procedure revolution.
This troubling reality is directly on-point to my query; creating
exceptions that are loosely defined and not rigorously upheld
potentially creates a paradigm of excess. Interestingly, however-
and the caveat here is of extreme importance-none of the
violations occurred on American soil. That is, as aggressive as the
Bush Administration was with respect to the interrogation of
suspected, detained terrorists outside the U.S., similar methods
were not imposed on individuals detained in the U.S. Rather, such
individuals enjoyed full Miranda rights. This, then, is the most
surprising aspect of Attorney General Holder's recommendation:
interrogation measures subject to Miranda-Quarles limitations that
satisfied the Bush Administration are insufficient for the Obama
Administration.
Quarles created a specific public safety exception for on-the-
scene arrests that does not extend beyond the moment of arrest. I
do not suggest that those who seek to extend the public safety
"rendition," violates the 1984 Convention Against Torture if there is reasonable
cause to believe that the detainee will be subjected to measures that violate the
Convention's definition of torture. See generally Diane Marie Amann,
Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263 (2004).
84. The Convention was ratified by the U.S. Senate in October of 1990.
Yoav Gery, Note, The Torture Victim Protection Act: Raising Issues of
Legitimacy, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 597, 598 n.13 (1993).
85. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Their Additional Protocols, supra note 66.
86. Violating a Convention ratified by the Senate violates the Constitution.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
87. For example, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, an alleged (not convicted)
9/11 mastermind, was waterboarded over 150 times by U.S. interrogators. See
September 11 Mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed "Waterboarded 183
Times, " TIMES ONLINE (Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/us and americas/article6130165.ece.
88. See Q&A: Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/3701941.stm.
89. See Lynndie England Convicted in Abu Ghraib Trial, USA TODAY (Sept.
26, 2005), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-26-england-x.htm.
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exception created in Quarles90 advocate a return to the
unconscionable interrogations discussed above. The discussion
here is intended to unequivocally highlight the dangers of going
down a murky road with a slippery slope around the proverbial
corner. Terrorists are responsible for heinous acts against innocent
civilians, but that does not justify denying their right to counsel in
the interrogation setting. Miranda was based on the
unconscionable excesses of the past; to deliberately create an
exception beyond Quarles is fraught with danger.
Miranda did not, as some argue, deny law enforcement the
right to interrogate the detainee or the opportunity to do so with
counsel present. What it did was grant the suspect the right to
waive the privilege of self-incrimination and the right to counsel.
In that vein, it is essential to recall that in Gideon, 1 the right to
counsel for an indigent defendant was simultaneously extended
and limited to a criminal trial.92 That is, although Gideon extended
the privilege to indigent defendants in the courtroom, it did not
extend that protection to where the individual is particularly
vulnerable the detention cell. That extension is the essence of
Miranda.93
The courtroom is a splendid place where defense attorneys
bellow and strut and prosecuting attorneys are hemmed in at many
turns. But what happens before an accused reaches the safety and
90. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
91. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
92. For a legendary and memorable analysis of Gideon v. Wainwright, see
ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
93. See Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to.. . ,
in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). In affirming
Professor Kamisar's assessment and description regarding the interrogation
setting, I draw on my professional experiences as prosecutor, judge, and legal
advisor with direct involvement in the interrogation process. The most powerful
images are of the extraordinary tension and anxiety expressed, verbally and non-
verbally, by suspects held for the sole purpose of eliciting information from
them either to facilitate their trial or that of an associate. Similarly, the
responsibility articulated by the interrogators with respect to their "mission" is
equally powerful; in many ways, their ability to elicit correct and timely
information from suspects is the key to successful operational counterterrorism.
Without a doubt, the heart and soul of operational counterterrorism and of
effective law enforcement in the traditional paradigm "unfolds" in the
interrogation setting, which I have previously described as "fraught with the
sweat of fear and anxiety." Furthermore, information that is either mis-
information or dis-information significantly hampers effective operational
counterterrorism/law enforcement and is a (perhaps "the") primary reason why
professional interrogators uniformly dismiss the value of enhanced interrogation
measures, subject to narrow, specific exceptions and circumstances.
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enjoys the comfort of this veritable mansion? Ah, there's the rub.
Typically he must first pass through a much less pretentious
edifice, a police station with bare back rooms and locked doors. In
this gatehouse of American criminal procedure-through which
most defendants journey and beyond which many never get-the
enemy of the state is a depersonalized subject to be sized up and
subjected to interrogation tactics and techniques most appropriate
for the occasion; he is game to be stalked and cornered.
Coming to the conclusion in Miranda was not by chance; it
was, as we have seen, an evolving process predicated on history,
an increasing realization that rights were consistently violated, and
a growing understanding that the Supreme Court was obligated to
guarantee the rights of individuals in the interrogation paradigm.
Although the Court in Quarles created an exception, it did so
narrowly and specifically. Given the extraordinarily broad range of
terrorism-however defined-denying Miranda rights to terrorism
suspects in the interrogation paradigm is truly to turn the clock
back.
94. Id.
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